Abstract-In a Cross-Origin State Inference (COSI) attack, an attacker convinces a victim into visiting an attack web page, which leverages the cross-origin interaction features of the victim's web browser to infer the victim's state at a target web site. COSI attacks can have serious consequences including determining if the victim has an account or is the administrator of a prohibited target site, determining if the victim owns sensitive content or is the owner of a specific account at the target site.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a Cross-Origin State Inference (COSI) attack, the attacker's goal is to determine the state of a victim visiting an attack page (e.g., attack.com/index.html), in a target web site that is not controlled by the attacker (e.g., linkedin.com). The state of a user in a target web site is defined by login status, account, and content properties. For example, the user may be logged into the site; have a normal, premium, administrator, or restricted (e.g., for under-age users) account; or be the owner of some content hosted at the site. The state of a user determines what content and functionality the user may access in the target web site. For example, users that are not logged in can only access public content, normal users cannot access premium functionality, and uploaded content can only be edited or removed by its owner.
Determining the state of a victim in a target web site can have important security implications. For example, determining that a victim is logged into a target web site implies that the victim owns an account in that site. This is problematic for privacy-sensitive web sites such as those related to post-marital affairs and pornography. Determining content ownership can be used to establish if a program committee member is reviewing a specific paper in a conference management system, or if the victim has uploaded some copyrighted content to an anonymous file sharing site. Deanonymizing the account owner, i.e., determining if a victim owns a specific account, enables identifying which company employee runs an anonymous blog criticizing the company's management. Such state inferences are even more critical when the attacker is a nation state that performs censorship and can determine if the victim has an account in, or is the administrator of, some prohibited web site. The problem is aggravated by COSI attacks being web attacks, which can be performed even when the victim employs anonymization tools such as a virtual private network.
COSI attacks are a type of cross-origin browser sidechannels. The attacker convinces the victim to visit an attack page. The attack page includes at least one state-dependent URL (SD-URL) from the target web site, whose response depends on the state of the visitor. For example, a SD-URL may point to some content in the target web site only accessible when the victim has a specific state such as being authenticated and owning the content. The inclusion forces the victim's browser to send a cross-origin request to the target web site. Since the request is cross-origin, the same-origin policy (SOP) prevents the attack page from directly reading the response. However, the attacker can leverage a browser leak method (or XS-Leak) in the browser to infer, from the cross-origin response, the victim's state at the target web site.
Multiple instances of COSI attacks have been found in the last 13 years by both security analysts (e.g., [22] , [23] , [29] , [32] , [36] , [46] ) and academics (e.g., [17] , [27] , [34] , [58] ), with roughly half of them being presented in the last four years, and several already in 2019 (e.g., [50] , [55] ). However, they have previously been considered as sparse attacks under different names such as login detection attacks [30] , [31] , [46] , login oracle attacks [45] , [51] , cross-site search attacks [27] , URL status identification attacks [42] , and cross-site frame leakage attacks [50] . Unfortunately, those attack instances have not been generalized. Thus, many are variants of each other, with many other variants remaining unknown. As far as we know, we are the first to systematically study these attacks and group them under the same COSI attack denomination. We introduce the concept of a COSI attack class, which defines the SD-URLs that can be attacked using a specific XS-Leak, the affected browsers, and the set of inclusion methods (i.e., HTML tags and DOM methods) that can be used to include the SD-URL in the attack page. Our study identifies 39 COSI attack classes, of which 22 are new and the rest generalize prior attacks, covering many new attack variants. We identify a novel XS-Leak based on window.postMessage, which affects popular sites such as blogger.com, ebay.com, reddit.com, and youtube.com. We also discuss existing and upcoming defenses against COSI attacks.
We design a novel approach to detect COSI attacks based on our attack classes. Such detection is currently a painful manual task. This is problematic as finding COSI attacks requires an exhaustive exploration of both the target web site and XSLeaks, a task poorly suited for manual analysis. We implement our approach into Basta-COSI, the first tool to detect COSI attacks. Given as input a target web site and state scripts defining the user states at the target web site, Basta-COSI identifies SD-URLs in the target web site, tests if those SDURLs can be attacked using any of the 39 attack classes, and produces attack pages that combine multiple attack vectors to demonstrate the existence of COSI attacks to distinguish different states.
We have applied Basta-COSI to test 10 targets: four popular stand-alone web applications (HotCRP, GitLab, GitHub, and OpenCart) and six popular live sites (amazon.com, blogge r.com, drive.google.com, linkedin.com, pinterest.com, and pornhub.com). Basta-COSI discovers COSI attacks against all of them with no false positives. The discovered attacks include deanonymization attacks for determining if the victim is the reviewer of a paper in HotCRP, owns a blog in blogger.com, an account in pornhub.com, or a GitLab/GitHub repository. In addition, login detection attacks are found in all 10 targets, account type detection attacks in three, and an access detection attack in one. Attacks have been disclosed to the affected web applications, websites, and browser vendors. The following are the main contributions of this paper:
• We perform the first systematic study of COSI attacks. We present COSI attacks as a comprehensive category and introduce the concept of a COSI attack class to capture related attack variants. We identify 39 attack classes, of which 22 are new and the rest generalize prior attacks.
• We discover a novel XS-Leak based on window.postMessage that affects the three major browsers and can be leveraged to attack popular web sites.
• We design and implement Basta-COSI, the first tool for detecting COSI attacks. Given as input a target web site and state scripts defining the states at the target web site, Basta-COSI detects SD-URLs, identifies those that can be attacked with any of the 39 attack classes, and generates attack pages that demonstrate the attacks.
• We apply Basta-COSI to four popular stand-alone web applications and six popular live sites, finding COSI attacks against all of them. The attacks found enable login detection, account deanonymization, account type inference, and access detection.
• We will publicly release Basta-COSI as part of a larger open-source framework for testing cloud-based applications [3] . 
II. OVERVIEW
This Section provides an overview of COSI attacks. Section II-A details the user state at a target web site. Section II-B describes the two phases of a COSI attack. Finally, Section II-C presents the COSI attack threat model.
A. User State
Most web sites have accounts owned by a user and identified by a username. In this paper a user is a person who visits a target web site and may or may not own an account in that site; it should not be confused with a username that identifies an account. Accounts are often anonymous, i.e., the person that owns the account is unknown. Deanonymizing an account means linking its username to the person owning the account. Web sites that do not have accounts often define sessions to identify users that visit them repeatedly. In those sites a session acts as an account for our purposes.
In a COSI attack, the attacker's goal is to infer the state of a victim user with respect to a target web site, not controlled by the attacker. The state of a user at a target web site is defined by the values of status, account, and ownership state attributes. Example state attributes are provided in Table I . The values of those state attributes define, at a given time, what content the user can access (or receives) from the target site. Status attributes include whether the user is logged in, logged out, logged in using a specific single sign-on (SSO) service, or has an ongoing session (i.e., in sites without user accounts). Account attributes include the account type (e.g., regular, premium, administrator), the account age category (e.g., underage user with restricted access). Ownership attributes include whether the user is the owner of some specific account and whether he/she owns some content stored in the site (e.g., a PDF paper in a conference management system).
The attributes that define the user's state are specific to each target site. Any of those attributes may be targeted by an attacker with different, often critical, security implications. For example, COSI attacks targeting the login status can be used by an oppressive regime to determine if the victim is logged in (and thus owns an account) in a censored site [18] , despite the victim using a VPN. They can also be used to blackmail users owning accounts in privacy-sensitive sites such as those related to pornography [20] and post-marital affairs [35] . Furthermore, they may be used as an initial step for Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [16] or Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [44] attacks. Attacks on session status have similar implications than those on login status for sites without user accounts. For example, they could be used to determine if a user previously visited a forbidden news site.
COSI attacks targeting ownership are also highly impactful. Content ownership can be used to determine if a program committee member is reviewing a specific paper, or if a user has uploaded some copyrighted content to an anonymous file sharing site. Account ownership can be used for deanonymizing the account in a closed-world setting, i.e., determining which of n known persons owns a specific account. Such closed-world deanonymization can be used to determine which company employee is the owner of an anonymous blog highly critical with the company's management.
Attacks that target account type, account age category, and login status can be used to fingerprint the victim [9], [37] , and applied for targeted advertising by a malicious publisher in an open-world setting (where the set of users is unknown). Finally, knowledge of the SSO service used by the victim can be used to exploit a vulnerability in that SSO [12] , [13] , [60] .
State scripts. In this work, we capture states at a target site using state scripts that can be executed to automatically log into the target site using a configurable browser and the credentials of a specific account with a unique configuration. For example, we may create multiple user accounts with different configurations, e.g., premium and free accounts, two users that own different blogs, or authors that have submitted different papers to a conference management system. We also create a state script for the logged out state.
B. COSI Attack Overview
In a COSI attack, the attacker convinces a victim to visit an attack page. The attack page leverages the cross-origin functionalities of the victim's web browser to infer the victim's state at a target web site. A COSI attack comprises of two phases: preparation and attack.
Preparation. The goal of the preparation phase is to create an attack page that when visited by a victim will leak the victim's state at the target web site. An attack page implements at least one, possibly more, attack vectors. Each attack vector is a triplet of a state-dependent URL from the target web site, an inclusion method to embed the SD-URL in the attack page, and an attack class that defines, among others, a leak method (or XS-Leak) that interacts with the victim's browser to disclose a victim's state at the target site. An attack page may contain multiple attack vectors. For example, it may need to chain attack vectors to uniquely distinguish a state, e.g., one to identify if the victim is logged in, and another to identify if a logged victim has a premium account.
We say that a URL is state-dependent if, when requested through HTTP(S), it returns different responses depending on the state it is visited from. Note that it is not needed that each state returns a different response. For example, if there are 6 states and two different responses, each for three states, the URL is still state-dependent. The SD-URL is included by the attack page using an inclusion method such as an HTML tag (e.g., img, script) or a browser DOM method (e.g., window.open). When the attack page is visited by the victim, the inclusion method forces the victim's browser to automatically request the SD-URL from the target site. The specific response received depends on the victim's current state. SD-URLs are very common in web applications. For example, in many web applications, sending a request for a profile's picture will return an image if the user is logged in, but will return an error page, or a redirection to the login page, if not logged in. Similarly, in a blog application, a new post can only be added if the user is both logged in and the owner of the blog.
The request induced by the attack page for a SD-URL at the target site is cross-origin, and thus controlled by the Same-Origin Policy (SOP) [65] . The SOP prevents the attack page from directly reading the contents of a crossorigin response [14] . However, there exist XS-Leaks that allow bypassing a browser's SOP to disclose information about cross-origin responses. For example, the EventsFired XS-Leak distinguishes responses to SD-URLs that trigger a callback in one state (e.g., onload) and another callback (e.g., onerror), or no callback, in another state.
While a target site may contain many SD-URLs, only a subset of those may be useful to mount a COSI attack. One main challenge with XS-Leaks is that they are specific to certain types of SD-URLs and certain browsers. Unfortunately, this key concept is missing from prior works presenting COSI attacks, which thus do not provide this information. In this work, we introduce the concept of a COSI attack class, which defines the two different responses to a SD-URL that can be distinguished using a XS-Leak, the possible inclusion methods that can be used in conjunction with the XS-Leak, and the browsers affected. Section III describes our approach to identify attack classes and the 39 COSI attack classes we have found.
Based on the attack classes, we propose a novel approach to detect COSI attacks. Our approach first collects the responses to the same URL from different states. SD-URLs will be the ones that produce different responses in some states. Each pair of different responses coming from distinct states is matched with the list of known attack classes. If a matching attack class is found, then an attack vector can be built to distinguish the responses (and thus the states that produce them) that uses that SD-URL, the XS-Leak in the attack class, and one of the inclusion methods defined by the attack class. Since there may be n > 2 states that need to be distinguished, the process repeats until sufficient attack vectors are identified to uniquely distinguish the target state to be attacked. We have implemented this approach into Basta-COSI, the first tool to detect COSI attacks, detailed in Section IV.
Attack. In the attack phase, the attacker convinces the victim into visiting the attack page. This can be achieved in multiple Listing 1: A simple login detection attack page ways. One possibility is sending an email with the attack page URL and some text to convince the victim to click on it. Another possibility is a watering-hole approach where the attacker injects the attack page URL into a vulnerable page that the victim is likely to visit. The method used to convince the victim to visit the attack page is outside the scope of this paper.
When the attack page is loaded at the victim's browser, it first checks the browser used by the victim and then delivers attack vectors suitable for that browser. Once the victim's state is leaked, the attack page reports it back to the attack site.
C. Threat Model
This section describes the COSI attack threat model, detailing the assumptions we make about each actor.
Attacker. We assume that the attacker can trick victims into loading the attack page on their web browsers. During preparation, the attacker has the ability to create and manage different accounts at the target web site, or in a local installation of the target's web application. The attacker controls an attack web site where he/she can add arbitrary pages. Finally, we assume the attacker can identify the victim's browser version (e.g., from the User-Agent header) to select the right attack vector. Victim. The victim uses a fully up-to-date web browser and can be lured by the attacker into visiting the attack webpage. We assume that the victim logs into the target web site with the same web browser used to visit the attack page. Target site. The target site contains at least one SD-URL for which the attacker knows an attack class. The target site does not suffer from any known vulnerabilities. In particular, resources containing sensitive information are protected from direct cross-origin reads, i.e., the target site does not contain CORS misconfigurations [43] or critical cross-site script inclusion vulnerabilities [45] .
III. COSI ATTACK CLASSES
This work introduces COSI attack classes, which group similar attack instances with the same underlying cause, potentially capturing many unknown variants. A COSI attack class is a 6-tuple that comprises of a class name, signatures for two groups of responses that can be distinguished using the attack class, an XS-Leak, a list of inclusion methods that can be used to embed the SD-URL in an attack page, and the list of affected browsers. An attack class captures the SD-URLs that can be used for building an attack vector against the affected browsers using the XS-Leak and one of the inclusion methods defined. This section first presents our approach to discover COSI attack classes in Section III-A and then details the 39 attack classes identified in Section III-B
A. Discovering Attack Classes
Our process to discover COSI attack classes comprises of three main steps: (1) identify and validate previously proposed COSI attack instances; (2) generalize known COSI attack instances into COSI attack classes; and (3) discover previously unknown attack classes. Identifying attack instances. We performed a survey of COSI attack instances presented in prior work. This is the first work to present COSI attacks as a unique category of web attacks. Thus, we could not simply search for entries referencing COSI attacks, making it a laborious process. Our survey identified 20 prior works, listed in Table VII and described in Section VII. Out of those, 11 are blog posts, 7 are academic papers, one is a bug report, and the last one is a recent project that tries to enumerate all known DOM APIs that leak crossorigin information [59] . This project was created in February 2019 when we had already been performing this work for months, and covers only a subset of the attack classes we have identified. Those 20 prior works presented 31 attack instances. All attack instances could be validated in at least Requests to the test application define how the response should look (i.e., which headers and body to return). For validation, we configured our test application to return the same responses described in the previous work. This allowed us to validate attack instances even when a SD-URL in the target site was no longer active.
Generalizing instances into classes. Generalizing a COSI attack instance into a COSI attack class comprises of two steps. First, identifying the set of responses to the inclusion method that still trigger the same observable difference in the browser (e.g., onload/onerror or different object property values). Then, checking if the observable difference still manifests with other inclusion methods and browsers. The generalization uses the test application to control the response received from a potential target site. We illustrate it using an attack instance of the EF-StatusErrorObject attack class. The generalization starts with the response that triggers the onload callback and tries to modify each response element (header or body) to a different value. If the modification still triggers the onload callback, then the element can be ignored.
In our example, all fields can be ignored, except the status code that it should be 200 and the content-type that should not correspond to an audio or video. The generalization then repeats for the response that triggers the onerror callback, returning that the status code should not be success (200) Table III and described in the next section. Table III details the 39 attack classes identified by the above process. For each attack class, the table shows the name we assigned to the class; a description of the two different responses by a SD-URL that can be targeted using this attack class; the attack page logic with the methods that can be used to include the SD-URL and the XS-Leak to distinguish the responses; and the affected browsers. In each response description we abbreviate HTTP fields as follows: Status Code (sc), Content-Type (ct), X-Content-Type-Options (xcto), Content-Disposition (cd), and response body (bdy). EventsFired. The first 19 attack classes use the events fired in the browser as XS-Leak and hence are denoted by the prefix EF-. The first attack class EF-StatusErrorScript can target SDURLs that return in one state a success status code (sc = 200) with JavaScript (JS) content (ct = text/javascript), and return an error (sc = (4xx OR 5xx)) in another state. The events fired by both types of responses are different (onload in one case, onerror in the other) allowing to distinguish the two responses. This attack class works on all browsers. Among these 19 attack classes, 13 are new and for the other 6 attack instances had been previously proposed. Most of these 19 involve the type or disposition of the content, including content-sniffing (X-Content-Type-Options). There are also cases related to the X-Frame-Options header. Object Properties. The next 13 attack classes leverage as XS-Leak the readable properties of the included resource. Out of these 13, 8 are new attack classes, while the rest have been generalized to define the SD-URLs affected, include more properties, and add new inclusion methods. For instance, in OP-ImgDimension, if a SD-URL returns images with different dimensions, the height and width properties allow to differentiate the responses. While this class was known to create a leak with those two properties [59] , our approach uncovers that the same attack can be applied as well using the naturalHeight and naturalWidth properties. Interestingly, OP-ImgCtMismatch presents a similar attack targeting SD-URLs that return an image and a non-image, which works because for non-image resources some browsers return the height and width of a broken image icon, triggering a difference in dimensions. The term (form, iframe) in OPFrameCount,OP-WindowProperties captures that it is possible to also include the resource using a form tag, to trigger a POST request, and embedding the response in an iframe [23] . All other attack classes leverage GET requests. PostMessage. This class uses a novel XS-Leak that as far as we know has not been previously mentioned. It can target SD-URLs that return different broadcasted postMessages, or a broadcast postMessage and no broadcast. It affects all three browsers. To read the postMessages, the attack page can include the SD-URL using the iframe tag, if the page does not use framing protection, or the window.open method if framing protection is used. To identify a difference between responses it compares the number of broadcast messages, the message origins, and the message content. The message content is compared using the Jaro string distance [40] to account for small session-specific or user-specific differences.
B. Attack Classes Description
CSSPropRead. Another XS-Leak leverages SD-URLs that return different CSS rules for different states. To identify the differences, the attack page is designed to contain elements affected by the differing rules and to check the inherited style rules. Some attack instances in this class were previously known [22] , [31] . This class complements the OP-LinkSheet and OP-LinkSheetStatusError classes, which can differentiate between CSS and non-CSS responses.
JSError. When a SD-URL returns different JavaScript files, where one contains a JS error and the other does not, this difference can be detected using the window.onerror() callback function. The original attack instance used window.onerror() to read the line number and the type of JS error triggered [29] . But, since Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI) attacks [28] , [57] abused the verbosity of window.onerror(), popular browsers no longer return the error line. However, we find the attack still works by comparing the number of errors triggered. This class complements EF-StatusErrorIFrame, which allows differentiating JS and non-JS responses.
JSObjectRead. Another XS-Leak for differentiating responses that contain JS files checks the presence or absence of certain readable objects in the included JS. The original attack instance checked for global variables [28] , but later attacks also leveraged techniques such as prototype tampering and global API redefinition [45] .
CSPViolation. When a SD-URL redirects visitors to the same origin in a state and to a different origin in another state, this difference can be detected using a Content Security Policy (CSP). The attacker configures its attack site with a CSP policy for the attack page that states that any attempt to load a resource from an origin different than the attack site should send a violation report back to the attack site. This method was originally proposed for leaking sensitive information in the CSP report (e.g. in the path and subdomain) [36] . Browsers then removed the path information from CSP reports, but the attack still works by focusing on whether the CSP violation report is received (redirection to different origin) or not (redirection to same origin).
AppCacheError. When a SD-URL returns a success status code (2xx) in one state and a redirection (3xx) or error (4xx, 5xx) in another, this difference can be detected through the browser's AppCache [8] . The attack page uses the manifest attribute of the html tag to refer to an AppCache manifest file, which includes the SD-URL in the list of URLs that should be cached. This forces the browser to request the SD-URL. If the SD-URL returns a success status code, an AppCache cached event is triggered. If the SD-URL returns a redirection or error, an AppCache error event is triggered instead. Lee et al. [42] first presented this attack showing that it affected five browsers. However, this XS-Leak currently only works in Chromium-based browsers because Firefox and Edge no longer allow cross-origin URLs to be cached using AppCache.
Timing. Multiple works have shown that timing differences when a resource is loaded from different states can be used to distinguish those states [17] , [23] , [27] , [58] . The main challenge with this attack class is that it requires accurate timing information and is subject to network conditions. Thus, these works have compared different approaches to calculate load, response, and parsing times.
IV. BASTA-COSI
We have designed and implemented Basta-COSI, a tool for assisting a security analyst in identifying, and generating evidence of, COSI attacks in a target site. Basta-COSI focuses on the COSI attack preparation phase. It takes as input a target site, a set of state scripts defining states in the target site, and the attack classed identified in Section III. It outputs attack pages, which can be used by a security analyst for demonstrating the existence of COSI attacks to the developer of the web application or the administrator of a site that deploys the application.
Setup. Basta-COSI needs to have network access to the target site. This may be a local installation of the target web application if its source code is available (e.g., GitLab, HotCRP) or the final target web site otherwise (e.g., LinkedIn, Facebook). The analyst needs to be able to create user accounts in the target site. Those accounts should cover different account types and should be populated with content, e.g., filling the user profile, creating a blog, and adding blog entries. For example, to test the open source HotCRP conference management system, the analyst prepares a local installation by creating a test conference and four user accounts: two authors, and two reviewers. Then, he/she submits a paper using each of the author accounts. Finally, it assigns the paper submitted by the first author to the first reviewer and the paper submitted by the second author to the second reviewer.
Once the target site is configured, the analyst creates state scripts that can be executed to automatically load a specific state at a web browser. i.e., to log into the tested web application using one of the created accounts or to log out of an account. Basta-COSI currently supports state scripts written using the Python Selenium WebDriver [5] . The web browser to be used is an argument to the state script. In our HotCRP example, the analyst creates five state scripts. The first four scripts open a web browser, visit the login page, and authenticate using one of the four created accounts. The last script logs in and then logs out to capture the logged out state. Architecture. The architecture of Basta-COSI is shown in Figure 1 . It takes as input the state scripts, a set of browsers, the configured target site, and a target state. It outputs an attack page that enables leaking if a victim is in the target state at the target site. Basta-COSI comprises of three modules: URL data collection, attack vector identification, and attack page generation.
The URL data collection module crawls the target site to discover URLs. It visits each discovered URL to collect its response when visited from a specific state with a specific browser. And, it compares the responses to the same URL obtained from different states to identify SD-URLs that may be candidates to be used in attack pages.
Next, the attack vector identification checks if any of the SD-URLs can be attacked using the known COSI attack classes. When needed, it visits each SD-URL using a set of inclusion vectors to collect browser events that can only be obtained with a specific inclusion method (e.g., postMessages), or that cannot be easily obtained statically from the HTTP(S) responses (e.g., JS errors, readable JS objects). For each SD-URL that matches an attack class, it outputs an attack vector.
Finally, the attack page generation module builds an attack page that enables identifying if the victim is in the target state at the target site. The generated attack page may combine multiple attack vectors. For example, it may combine a login detection vector with another vector for distinguishing a specific account type,and it may include different attack vectors for each browser. Attack pages for different target states can be created by re-running the attack page generation module, without re-running the previous modules.
A. URL Data Collection
The URL data collection module performs three main tasks: crawling to discover URLs, collecting the responses for each URL when visited from a specific state with a specific browser, and identifying SD-URLs. The module is built on top of the Spider crawler for OWASP ZAP [4] . The crawling considers a URL to be part of the target site if it satisfies at least one of three constraints: it is hosted at the target site domain, it redirects to a URL hosted at the target site domain, or it is part of a redirection chain involving a URL satisfying any of the above two criterion.
B. Attack Vector Identification
The goal of the attack vector identification module is to find, among all the SD-URLs discovered, the ones for which a matching attack class is known, and thus can be used to generate attack vectors. Basta-COSI supports all attack classes in Table VII . Those attack classes can be split into two groups. The first (static) group are attack classes for which it can be determined, using solely the collected logs of HTTP(S) responses, if a SD-URL matches the class. This group includes all classes that capture differences in HTTP headers such as Status Code, Content-Type, or X-Frame-Options. The second (dynamic) group are attack classes for which matching a SD-URL requires data difficult to obtain from the responses such as JS errors, postMessages, and audio/video properties (e.g., width, height, duration). For this group, it is needed to visit the SD-URL with different inclusion methods to collect the missing data. For each SD-URL and pair of states that return different responses for that SD-URL, the module first checks if there exist any matching static attack class. For efficiency, if two different state pairs produce the same responses, there is no need to query the attack classes for the second pair. We illustrate this process using the SD-URLs in Table IV . For doc.php, the responses from (R1, R2) match two static attack classes: EF-StatusErrorObject, EF-StatusErrorLink. Similarly, the responses from (R2, LO) match the same two static attack classes as (R1, R2). Finally, the states (R1, LO) match the static attack classes EF-CtMismatchObject and EF-XctoScript. The process repeats with the other SD-URL (offline.php). Since states R1 and R2 return the same response, the (R1, R2) pair can be ignored. For states (R1, LO), the attack class EFXctoScript matches. Finally, for states (R2, LO) the responses are the same as for (R1, LO) and there is no need to check them again.
In our example, all state pairs can be distinguished using a static attack class. If that was not the case, the module would collect additional information to check the dynamic attack classes. For this, the SD-URL is included in a set of data collection pages hosted at a test web server. Each page uses an inclusion method from one of the dynamic classes and collects the required dynamic data for the class (e.g., use script to collect JS errors and JS readable objects). Each data collection page is visited with each browser and from every state that returns a unique response.
The attack vector identification module outputs, for each pair of states, a list of pairs (SD-URL, AttackClass) specifying that an attack vector that uses the SD-URL and the attack class can distinguish those two states for the browsers defined by the attack class.
C. Attack Page Generation
Given a target state s t and a set of target browsers B, the goal of the attack page generation is to produce an attack page that distinguishes s t from the other states, when visited by a browser in B. The set of target browsers should be equal to or a subset of the set of browsers input to Basta-COSI. This process comprises of two steps: attack vector selection and attack page construction.
Algorithm 1 details the attack vector selection. It selects, among all attack vectors, the ones needed to distinguish the target state when visited by a target browser. The algorithm first removes all attack vectors that do not include the target state since they do not enable distinguishing s t (Line 3). In our HotCRP example, the target state is R2 and all attack vectors for state pair (R1, LO) are removed. Then, it merges the states of all remaining attack vectors with the same SD-URL and attack class into a single attack vector that distinguishes S t from n ≥ 2 other states. In our example, attack vectors (R1, R2, doc.php, EF-StatusErrorObject) and (R2, LO, doc.php, EF-StatusErrorObject) are merged into ({R1, LO}, doc.php, EF-StatusErrorObject). Next, it initializes a set P with all pairs of states and browsers to be distinguished (Line 5). The algorithm goes into a loop that at each iteration it identifies the attack vector that covers most remaining pairs in P (Lines 6-14) . The loop iterates until all pairs have been covered, no attack vectors remain, or the remaining attack vectors do not allow distinguishing the remaining pairs. To select an attack vector, a score function is used that assigns higher scores to attack vectors that cover more pairs in P , penalizing attack classes that may interfere with other vectors (Line 7). For example, a CSP policy for CSPViolation that targets script resources may interfere with an EventsFired vector that uses the script tag. If the score is zero, the loop breaks as the remaining attack vectors do not allow distinguishing the remaining pairs. Otherwise, the selected attack vector is appended to the output list (Line 10), the newly covered pairs are removed from P (Line 11), and the selected attack vector is removed from the available list (Line 12). In our example, the first loop iteration selects the attack vector ({R1, LO}, doc.php, EF-StatusErrorObject) as it covers four pairs, differentiating all states for Firefox and Edge. The next loop iteration selects attack vector ({R1, LO}, doc.php, EF-StatusErrorLink), which covers the two remaining pairs, distinguishing all states for Chrome. At that point, no more pairs remain to be covered, and the algorithm outputs the selected attack vectors. The algorithm also outputs the pair set P . If empty, the attack page distinguishes the target state from all other states for all target browsers. Otherwise, some states may not be distinguishable for some target browsers.
For each attack class, the attack page generation module has a template to implement the attack. For each selected attack vector, it chooses one inclusion method in the attack class, and applies the corresponding template with the SD-URL. All instantiated templates are integrated into the output attack page.
V. EXPERIMENTS
This section presents the evaluation of Basta-COSI on four open source web applications (HotCRP, GitLab, GitHub Enterprise, OpenCart) and six popular web sites (linkedin.com, blogger.com, amazon.com, pornhub.com, drive.google.com, and pinterest.com). These targets were selected because they are popular, allow us to test on white-box (open source) and black-box (deployed) scenarios, and cover services with multiple user states: conference management, source code development, online shopping, privacy-sensitive site, image sharing, and file storage. First, Section V-A describes the results of Basta-COSI, then Section V-B details the attacks found, and finally Section V-C analyzes the prevalence of the postMessage attack class. Ethics. Our testing does not target any real user of the live sites. All testing on live sites is restricted to user accounts that we created on those sites exclusively for this purpose. The process of validating that the attacks found on opensource web applications work on live installations of those applications is similarly restricted to accounts owned by the authors. The impact on live sites is limited to receiving a few thousand requests for valid resources in the site. We spread the requests over time to avoid spike loads.
We have responsibly disclosed the attacks found to the affected web application and website maintainers. We have received a response confirming the attacks in all cases, except for OpenCart that has not yet replied. We avoid providing details for attacks not yet patched. We have also reported our results to the three browser vendors. We incorporate their feedback into our defenses discussion in Section VI.
A. Basta-COSI Evaluation
For every target web application and site, Table V summarizes the results for each tool module, as well as the COSI attacks found. The data collection part shows the number of input state scripts provided to Basta-COSI, the number of URLs crawled, and the number of SD-URLs identified.
The attack vector identification part shows the total number of attack vectors identified, the number of state pairs they cover, and the number of XS-Leaks they use. The attack page generation part shows the number of states uniquely distinguished (UD) from other states, the number of states partially distinguished (PD) excluding UD states, and the minimum/average/maximum attack vectors in the attack pages. Finally, the attacks found part shows the type and browsers affected for the identified attacks.
Depending on the target, we created 3-6 state scripts to use Basta-COSI. One script always corresponds to the logged out (LO) state and the others are target-specific. For example, for GitLab the other 5 states are for maintainer, developer, reporter, guest (read-only access), and a user with no read access to the repository. Similar to a fuzzing tool, Basta-COSI will try to find attacks until the allocated time budget runs out. We let Basta-COSI run for a maximum of 24 hours on each target, although after a few hours the crawling typically does not find any new URLs. The data collection results show that SD-URLs are very common, on average 68% of the discovered URLs are SD-URLs (and up to 99% in GitHub). Basta-COSI finds between 58 and 1,364 attack vectors in each target. Those attack vectors use between 1 and 5 XS-Leaks. Table VI details the distribution of attack vectors per XS-Leak for each target and browser pair. The results show that most attack vectors correspond to EventsFired attack classes, but Basta-COSI finds attack vectors for 5 XS-Leaks. Some states can be uniquely identified, i.e., distinguished from any other state, and the rest can be partially distinguished. We found no state that could not be distinguished at all. It is important to note that partially distinguishable states can also be used in attacks. For example, not being able to differentiate the administrator from a normal user does not matter if the administrator is not targeted by the attack, i.e., not sent the attack page URL.
The summary of attacks found shows that Basta-COSI is able to identify COSI attacks in all target applications and sites evaluated. We manually evaluated the generated attack pages and found no false positives. We do not evaluate false negatives, as we lack ground truth of the COSI attacks present in the targets. However, we acknowledge that, similar to any testing tool, false negatives are possible, e.g., Basta-COSI can only find COSI attacks that are a variant of the 39 attack classes it supports. For every target, at least a login detection attack is found that can uniquely identify the logged out state. For 8 of the 10 targets, other types of attacks are found, including account deanonymization attacks in 7 of the 10 targets. The attacks are detailed in the next section.
B. Description of the Attacks
This section describes the attacks Basta-COSI found. Since login detection attacks were found for all targets, and login detection is often a prerequisite for other attacks, we focus on attacks targeting other states. All attacks work on the three tested browsers, unless specifically noted. HotCRP. Two attacks are found that allow determining whether the victim is a reviewer of a specific paper. To launch a reviewer deanonymization attack, the attacker collects the email addresses of the program committee members and sends them a spear-phishing email to convince them to click on the attack page URL. A simplified version of the first attack is illustrated in our running example in Section IV and leverages GitLab. Attacks are found that allow determining if the victim is the owner of a repository, or owns a snippet that stores code and text to be shared with other users. Both attacks first use a login detection attack. If the victim is logged in, the attack page mounts the EventFire attack using the URL for editing the repository settings or the snippets to detect if the victim has administrative rights over them. Given that the username is part of the URL of a GitLab repository, a deanonymization attack can also be mounted.
GitHub. An attack allows distinguishing the GitHub Enterprise account type (administrator or normal user) by including the URL for accessing staff tools. The other attacks are similar to the GitLab ones, allowing to identify if the victim owns a specific repository, or a gist (GitHub's version of a snippet).
OpenCart. A EF-CtMisMatchScript attack is found that can identify if the victim performed an order, provided the order identifier (OID) is known.
LinkedIn. A CSPViolation attack allows distinguishing the account type (free or premium) using the SD-URL https: //www.linkedin.com/cap/. This attack has already been fixed following our disclosure. A second attack allows determining if the victim is the owner of a specific LinkedIn profile using the OP-WindowProperties attack class. The underlying cause of this attack is that the number of frames in a LinkedIn profile page is 3 when visited by the owner of the profile, and 4 otherwise. A third attack allows determining whether the victim has previously visited LinkedIn or not. This attack only affects Firefox and Edge and could be used for targeted advertising.
Blogger. Multiple attacks are found that enable identifying if the victim is the owner of a specific blog, thus deanonymizing the blog owner. Attacks are possible with different attack classes (e.g., EF-CtMismatchScript, EF-CtMismatchObject).
The attacker needs to know the blogID of the target victim, which can be found on the HTML source of the target blog.
Amazon. CSPViolation attacks are found that leak if the victim is using the Amazon Kindle Direct Publishing (KDP) service, or has accepted the KDP terms and policies. That information could be used for targeted advertising, e.g., to show advertisements of kindle books to the victim.
Pornhub. Attacks are found using the OP-Window-Properties and OP-FrameCount that allow to determine if the victim is the owner of a specific username, thus enabling deanonymization of the account in a closed-world setting. The underlying reason for the OP-FrameCount attack is similar to that of the LinkedIn attack, but mounted on Pornhub's playlist URLs.
Google Drive. Multiple ObjectProperty-based attacks are found to identify if the victim visiting the attack page is one among N different Google users (e.g., all the employees of a company). For each target user, the attacker uploads a specific resource in the attacker's Google drive and shares it with the corresponding user. Google drive has the option to not notify the person with whom the resource is being shared. When a victim visits the attack page, the attacker can determine if it is any of the N users.
Pinterest. A CSPViolation attack can be mounted with the Facebook SSO initiation URL for determining whether the victim authenticated into Pinterest using its Facebook account. A similar attack was found for Google's SSO.
C. postMessage Attacks
Since postMessage is a novel attack class that uses a previously unknown XS-Leak, we analyze its prevalence. Basta-COSI finds a postMessage login detection attack in Blogger. To use it the attacker creates a private blog, only accessible to the attacker, e.g., https://private-attacker-blog.blogspot.com. It embeds this URL in the attack page. Other logged users are notified that they don't have access to this resource through a page that uses postMessages. Instead, logged out users are redirected to the login page, which has no postMessages.
Finding one vulnerable target out of 10 tested shows that the attack is useful, but does not clarify its prevalence. For this, we conducted experiments on the Alexa Top 100 sites [6] . Out of the 100 sites, only 63 supported authentication, and out of them, 11 had a login detection attack using postMessage. These web sites include, among others, youtube.com, reddit .com, and ebay.com. This shows that the postMessage attack class is prevalent in popular sites.
VI. DEFENSES AGAINST COSI ATTACKS
This section discusses existing and upcoming defenses against COSI attacks. SameSite cookies. COSI attacks leverage the automatic inclusion of HTTP cookies [15] , client-side certificates [41] , and HTTP Authentication credentials [26] in requests sent by web browsers, known as the ambient authority problem in browsers [21] . Web sites can use the SameSite attribute in a Cookie header to prevent the browser from sending that cookie in cross-site requests [39] , [61] . This defense disables SD-URLs whose responses are based on states saved in cookies. On the other hand, it does not prevent leakage by HTTP Authentication credentials and client-side certificates, it needs to be set for each cookie; it may be challenging to deploy in web sites expecting legitimate cross-origin requests [52] ; and its implementation in browsers can have flaws [25] . When we disclosed our results to the browser vendors, we were told they plan to address COSI attacks by marking all cookies by default as SameSite=Lax, unless the site specifically disables them with SameSite=None, or makes it stricter with SameSite=Strict [63] . This change is already planned for Chrome [10] and Firefox [11] . Session-specific URLs. Web sites can use URLs that include a session-specific, non-guessable, token (e.g., a query parameter). The token must be cryptographically bound to the session identifier (e.g., the hash of the identifier), and the web site must verify this relationship for all HTTP requests. Sessionspecific URLs prevent the attacker from identifying SD-URLs for the victim's session, avoiding COSI attacks. This defense does not depend on browser vendors and can be deployed right away. On the other hand, it increases complexity, may impact performance, and the web site must ensure that the tokens cannot be leaked or brute forced [21] . Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy. An emerging HTTP response header that allows web sites to ask browsers to disallow crossorigin requests to specific resources [1] . The request is not prevented, rather the browser avoids leakage by stripping the response body. Currently supported by Chrome and Safari. Fetch metadata. An emerging set of HTTP request headers that send additional provenance data about a request [62] , e.g., the HTML element triggering a cross-site request. Currently supported by Chrome. A web site can use this information to design policies that block potentially malicious requests. e.g., inclusion of a non-image resource with an img tag. Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy. There is ongoing discussion on a new HTTP response header to prevent malicious web sites from abusing other web sites by opening them in a window [2] . This defense could protect against COSI attack classes that use the window.open inclusion method (e.g. OPWindow Properties, postMessage).
Tor Browser. The Tor Browser takes many preventive measures against timing-based COSI attacks [49] . Additionally, it isolates the browser's state based on the URL in the address bar. Therefore, it does not attach cookies and Authoriza- tion header values to cross-origin HTTP requests generated by inclusions using HTML tags. However, the state isolation is not enforced for the window.open method, so authentication headers are still attached to HTTP requests generated using this inclusion method. Therefore, Tor Browser users are still vulnerable to the new postMessage attack class we discovered.
VII. RELATED WORK
Prior COSI attack instances. Table VII summarizes the 20 prior works proposing COSI attack instances. The first instance we have identified of a COSI attack was proposed in 2006 by Grossman and Hansen [32] . It was a login detection attack using the img tag and the EventsFired XS-Leak (EFCtMismatchImg attack class). Since then, EventFired attacks have been shown to apply to other HTML tags and content types [18] , [30] , [31] , [59] . Recently, Staicu and Pradel [55] showed that EventsFired attacks can be combined with shareable images to deanonymize users of image sharing services.
In another blog post in 2006, Grossman [29] introduced the first instance of the JSError attack class that leverages the type and line number of errors triggered when a JavaScript resource is included using the script tag. This attack was then demonstrated on popular sites like Amazon [53] . Inspired by Grossman's attacks, Evans [22] presented the first instance of the CSSPropRead attack class, leveraging the presence of certain objects and variables from an included JS resource.
In a 2012 post Grossman presented multiple attack instances including the first instances of the JSObjectRead attack class and the first attack using the readable object properties XSLeak. Lekies et al. [45] extended the JSObjectRead class with more techniques such as prototype tampering and showed that JSObjectRead attacks can be defended by making the URLs of script files unpredictable and including JS parser-breaking strings in dynamic JS files. After Grossman's initial attack using the FrameCount readable object property, instances of attack classes leveraging other properties (e.g., window frame count, width, height, duration, cssRules) have been proposed [47] , [50] , [51] , [59] .
Homakov [36] , [37] showed that cross-origin and subdomain redirections can be detected by abusing CSP. This approach has been used for login detection and fingerprinting attacks [9] , [34] . Recently, Staicu et al. [55] show that a deanonymization attack can be mounted using images uploaded to GitHub. Our attacks on GitHub leverage instead non-image resources.
Bortz et al. [17] showed that the timing of the events fired when a resource is loaded using the img HTML tag is a good metric to determine the state of a user at a target site. Evans [23] and Gelernter and Herzberg [27] applied similar approaches for mounting cross-site search attacks. Goethem et al. [58] showed that the parsing time of the included resources is a better alternative and that the Referer and Origin headers can help preventing such attacks.
In this work, beyond surveying prior works presenting attack instances, we have introduced the concept of attack classes to generalize attack instances, discovered new COSI attack classes, built a tool to identify COSI attacks against a target site, and discussed possible defenses. Browser history sniffing attacks. Multiple works have studied history sniffing attacks that use browser side channels to determine whether a user has accessed certain web sites [19] , [24] , [48] , [54] , [64] . To defend against history sniffing attacks Jackson et al. proposed to increase the isolation of different origins [38] and Wondracek et al. proposed adding nonpredictable tokens in URLs and using the POST method [64] . History sniffing attacks are similar to COSI attacks in leveraging a browser side channel, but fundamentally differ in the absence of a target site and in that the attack page does not send cross-origin requests. Attacks using postMessage. Guan et al. [33] analyzed privacy issues in postMessages broadcasted by popular web sites and Stock et al. showed that usage of broadcasted postMessages has been increasing [56] . Our postMessage COSI attacks leverage differences between broadcasted postMessages in SDURLs and do not require that they contain sensitive data.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented COSI attacks as a comprehensive category and performed their first systematic study. We have introduced the concept of COSI attack classes to capture related attack variants and have identified 39 COSI attack classes, of which 22 are new, and the rest generalize existing attack instances. We have discovered a novel browser XSLeak based on window.postMessage. We have designed a novel approach to detect COSI attacks, and implemented it into Basta-COSI, the first tool to detect COSI attacks. Basta-COSI identifies SD-URLs in a target web site, tests if those SDURLs can be attacked using any of the 39 attack classes, and produces attack pages that demonstrate the existence of COSI attacks to distinguish different states. We have applied Basta-COSI to test four popular stand-alone web applications and six popular live sites, finding COSI attacks against all of them with no false positives. Finally, we have discussed defenses against COSI attacks.
